Using Xterm to Navigate the Huge Color Space

An interesting, and probably very old (1986?) flaw in libX11 allow crafted color names to mess up the client-server communication protocol and inject malicious X server requests. The flaw is comparable to SQLi injecting commands into database connections granting an attacker access to all features of the connection protocol. Searching for the root cause and also the origin of the problematic code turned into an excursion into software archeology.

Looking back to the early age of computer graphics, color space was quite limited due to the small color depth with ancient hard- and software. Often the whole color space was reduced to just black/white (1 bit), 16 colors (4 bits), later 8 or 16 bits. Even being a child of those times the early X-window system protocol specification considered way bigger color spaces, e.g. by allowing 16 bit color depth per color channel in AllocColor, see X.V11R1.tar.gz from 1987, file doc/Protocol/spec.

3896 AllocColor 3897 cmap: COLORMAP 3898 red, green, blue: CARD16 3899 => 3900 pixel: CARD32 3901 red, green, blue: CARD16 3902 3903 Errors: Colormap, Alloc 3904 3905 Allocates a read-only colormap entry corresponding to the closest RGB

Also Xterm, a simple graphical terminal, is of similar age and it was even maintained together with the ancient xfree86 X implementation, see a CVS commit entry from 19970618 changelog (older resources should exist, but I cold not locate them).

Revision 3.491 / (view) - annotate - [select for diffs] , Wed Jun 18 07:25:49 1997 UTC (9 years, 6 months ago) by dawes Branch: MAIN Changes since 3.490: +6 -2 lines Diff to previous 3.490 more xterm termcap updates

While being that old, still the procolol specification, a free server implementation (now Xorg) and even Xterm still exist and are maintained.

Exploring the Color Space Using OSCs

Even with AllocColor having 48 bits to specifiy a color, quite some hardware back then could only produce 16 different colors using a fixed palette instead of a per-pixel RGB color. The palette could be changed but therefore different programs sharing a screen via the X server for output had to negotiate the colors on the palette or the server had to tell, which are the colors available looking similar to the specification. The X protocol helped to do that by providing the AllocColor but also the LookupColor request. The later could be used to lookup a color by name.

LookupColor 1 92 opcode 1 unused 2 3+(n+p)/4 request length 4 COLORMAP cmap 2 n length of name 2 unused n STRING8 name | opcode, x, len p unused, p=pad(n)

Graphical terminals like Xterm, Rxvt, ... use(d) exactly such requests to negotiate the color then used to display graphical output. But they did this not only for themselves but also for programs run by the terminal. To allow hilighting of text output, programs can emit terminal control sequences to change the color or font. The terminal will react to the control sequences, select an appropriate color and paint the program output using X protocol requests sent to the graphics server. For example ls --color=always /home creates a colored directory listing:

$ ls --color=always /home | xxd 00000000: 1b5b 306d 1b5b 3031 3b33 346d 7465 7374 .[0m.[01;34mtest 00000010: 1b5b 306d 0a .[0m.

While the terminal control sequence used by ls may only select a predefined color, OSCs (Operating System Command Sequences) allow requesting any color by name or RGB specification, e.g. using those Python3 commands:

sys.stdout.buffer.write(b'\x07\x1b]11;purple4\x07') sys.stdout.buffer.write(b'\x07\x1b]11;#006f00015858\x07')

The color #006f00015858 is just a nice dark blue and is submitted to the X server using an AllocColor request. The full X protocol packet data is:

[op] [length][colormap id ][red ][green ][blue ][pad ] \x54\x75\x04\x00\x20\x00\x00\x00\x6f\x00\x01\x00\x58\x58\x00\x65 [op][mo][length][next X frame ..

The 0x54 is the opcode (AllocColor), 0x04 the length of the packet (0x4 * 4 bytes), then color map id and the color specification \x6f\x00\x01\x00\x58\x58\x00\x65. But the color specification itself (without the AllocColor header) would also be a valid X protocol request, but one for SetAccessControl. With mode set to 0 it will grant anyone access to the X server session, also key loggers, screen shot tools, ...:

SetAccessControl 1 111 opcode (0x6f) 1 mode 0 Disable 1 Enable 2 1 request length

Enjoying Exotic Colors With Loooong Names

Using the control sequence b'\x07\x1b]11;purple4\x07' allows color lookup by name. Emiting such sequence to Xterm will cause Xterm to perform a LookupColor X protocol request with the given name:

LookupColor 1 92 opcode 1 unused 2 3+(n+p)/4 request length 4 COLORMAP cmap 2 n length of name 2 unused n STRING8 name p unused, p=pad(n)

As there is no maximum OSC (operating system control) sequence length specified (at least I did not find any limits), Xterm takes whatever the program run inside Xterm requests. As the Xterm C program code uses size_t (64 bit on amd64 architecture), Xterm might allocate memory for color names many GBs large. Such long names may exhaust computer RAM in general, but XTerm itself is not harmed by it (unless OOM-killer is triggered). But when submitting such long names via the X protocol, the [CARD16] packet length (4 bytes per unit) will overflow but nevertheless the full packet data is transmitted. Therefore the X-server handles a truncated LookupColor packet. The part of the color name that did not fit in the packet is treated as subsequent X protocol request. See libx11/libx11-1.7.0/src/LookupCol.c how the request packet is created:

35 Status 36 XLookupColor ( 37 register Display *dpy, 38 Colormap cmap, 39 _Xconst char *spec, 40 XColor *def, 41 XColor *scr) ... 81 n = (int) strlen (spec); 82 LockDisplay(dpy); 83 GetReq (LookupColor, req); 84 req->cmap = cmap; 85 req->nbytes = n; 86 req->length += (n + 3) >> 2; 87 Data (dpy, spec, (long)n); 88 if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &reply, 0, xTrue)) {

Thus looking up an overlong color name allows injection of arbitrary X protocol requests with user controlled data and most likely loss of correct reading frame on the connection. The OSC data may contain only printable characters as color name. With such data it is not possible to inject e.g. a valid SetAccessControl packet directly. But other valid X protocol requests can be injected that consume not only data from the botched LookupColor request but also the first 8 bytes of a following AllocColor X protocol request. Due to the loss of the reading frame, the RGB color specification data is then executed as a separate X request with fully user controlled data. The server will process it and disable any X server authentication as requested.

The PoC also injects a ChangeKeyboardMapping request (configuration option) to mess up the keyboard map (making the keyboard unusable). The SetAccessControl request then turns of X-server authentication as can be seen by "xhost". If the attacker for any reason can reach the X-server socket he can then take full control of the logged on user session and usually execute code as that user. Another interesting X protocol request to inject is the XTestFakeInput request to inject keystrokes to "type" shell commands in the terminal.

The PoC disabled access control in 10/10 attempts while keymap messup plus access requests worked only 5/10 attempts in the testing environment.

$ xhost access control enabled, only authorized clients can connect SI:localuser:test $ xterm -e ./ xterm: warning, error event received: X Error of failed request: BadFont (invalid Font parameter) Major opcode of failed request: 48 (X_QueryTextExtents) Resource id in failed request: 0x54545454 Serial number of failed request: 312 Current serial number in output stream: 312 $ xhost access control disabled, clients can connect from any host SI:localuser:test

The exploit also works when the control sequences are embedded in log files, then (hazardously) displayed using cat or tail -f. Also running the PoC via SSH on a remote host will disable authentication on the local host.

$ xhost access control enabled, only authorized clients can connect SI:localuser:test $ xterm -e tail -f x.out xterm: warning, error event received: ... $ xhost access control disabled, clients can connect from any host SI:localuser:test $ xhost - access control enabled, only authorized clients can connect $ xterm -e ssh -F test@test ./ xterm: warning, error event received: ... $ xhost access control disabled, clients can connect from any host SI:localuser:test

All Fun Comes To an End

Meanwhile patches were released. Upstream patches in libX11-1.7.1 make various requests with oversized string data fail with an error without attempting to transmit the data to the server. See libx11 git commit 8d2e02ae650f00c4a53deb625211a0527126c605.

A mitigation patch was also to xterm (patch #367) to ignore GB-sized color name requests in control sequences.

For more information see UNPAR-2021-1 advisory or CVE-2021-31535. Various Linux distribution related bugtrackers show how the patches reach the end users, e.g. [BugArchLinux-1968], [BugDebian-988737], [BugGentoo-790824], [BugRedHat-1961822], [BugSuse-1182506].



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